OPTIMIZING THE COMPOSITION OF THE TAX BURDEN TO REDUCE THE SHADOW ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR UZBEKISTAN

Authors

  • Azizjon Sadullayevich Rakhmonov Kimyo International University in Tashkent Head of the Department of International Economics PhD in Economics, Acting Associate Professor https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6734-9504

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24132349

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between the scale of the shadow economy and not only the aggregate tax burden but also its composition, the balance between direct and indirect taxation, personal income tax progressivity, small-business tax regimes, and the distributional implications of value-added tax (VAT). Cross-country comparative materials and figures are analyzed descriptively and assessed against evidence from internationally peer-reviewed research. The coexistence of relatively high tax burdens and smaller shadow economies in high-income countries indicates that statutory tax rates alone are not decisive. The article proposes strengthening the automatic-stabilizer function of personal income taxation, facilitating gradual business formalization, and combining a broad VAT base with targeted compensation. It explicitly distinguishes descriptive cross-country associations from causal effects.

Keywords

shadow economy, tax burden, tax composition, regressivity, progressive income taxation, VAT, fiscal stabilizers, tax compliance, formalization

References

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Published

2026-10-01

How to Cite

Rakhmonov, A. S. (2026). OPTIMIZING THE COMPOSITION OF THE TAX BURDEN TO REDUCE THE SHADOW ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR UZBEKISTAN. Innovation Science and Technology, 2(10), 254–260. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24132349
Vol. 2 No. 10 (2026): Innovation Science and Technology