THE FINANCIAL-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE ANTI-MONOPOLY REGULATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17443741Keywords:
Digital economy, Anti-monopoly regulation, Platform economy, Market power, Data monopolyAbstract
This paper explores the transformation of anti-monopoly regulation through the lens of fnancial-theoreticalframeworks in the context of the digital economy. As platform-based business models reshape market structures and
consolidate power, traditional theories of competition and regulation face limitations. The study reviews classical,
neoclassical, and modern competition theories, evaluates key international regulatory approaches, and highlights the
inadequacies of fnancial models in addressing data-driven dominance. It proposes a multidisciplinary strategy that
combines fnance, law, and data science to guide effective policy for digital markets.
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